In the realm of metaethics—a branch of philosophy concerned with the nature, foundation, and meaning of ethical statements—expressivism stands out as a provocative and influential theory. Instead of treating moral claims as descriptions of objective moral facts, expressivism suggests that such statements express the speaker's attitudes or emotions. This perspective challenges traditional notions of moral objectivity and invites important questions about the nature and possibility of moral progress.
If moral statements don’t refer to facts but express attitudes, how can we talk meaningfully about improving our moral beliefs or progressing as a society? This article explores expressivism's core claims, its role in metaethics, and the philosophical implications it holds for understanding moral progress.
What Is Expressivism?
At its core, expressivism is a non-cognitivist theory in metaethics. It asserts that moral judgments do not state facts and are not truth-apt in the way empirical or scientific claims are. Instead, they function more like expressions of approval, disapproval, or emotional commitment.
For instance:
Saying "Stealing is wrong" is, according to expressivism, akin to saying "Boo to stealing!" or "I disapprove of stealing."
This position originated in the early 20th century with A.J. Ayer’s emotivism and was later refined by philosophers such as Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard.
Expressivism in Metaethics
In metaethics, theories are broadly divided into:
Cognitivism: Moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false.
Non-Cognitivism: Moral statements express attitudes or emotions, not beliefs.
Expressivism falls into the non-cognitivist camp. It attempts to explain why moral language behaves as if it refers to facts—why people argue over moral issues, revise their views, and reason about right and wrong—even if there are no moral facts.
Key Features of Expressivism:
Anti-Realism: Denies the existence of objective moral facts.
Quasi-Realism: Developed by Blackburn, this view attempts to explain how moral discourse can mimic realist language without committing to realism.
Semantic Challenge: Expressivism must explain how moral statements function in complex logical structures (e.g., conditionals or negations) without being truth-apt.
The Challenge of Moral Progress
If there are no objective moral facts, what does it mean to say society has made moral progress—e.g., by abolishing slavery or advancing LGBTQ+ rights?
This question is a critical pressure point for expressivism. The idea of moral progress seems to presuppose an external standard by which we can evaluate historical change as better or worse. But if moral claims merely express attitudes, how can we make sense of improvement?
Expressivist Responses:
Shifts in Attitudes:
Moral progress can be seen as a refinement or alignment of collective attitudes with values we deeply care about (e.g., fairness, compassion).
Progress is not about discovering new facts but about developing better ways of living together.
Internal Consistency and Coherence:
According to expressivists like Gibbard, moral progress involves increasing coherence in our moral attitudes and the justifiability of these attitudes to others.
For example, condemning racism and affirming equality becomes more coherent than accepting arbitrary discrimination.
Better Expression of Shared Values:
Progress can mean that we become better at expressing values like justice or liberty in practical policies and social norms.
This view aligns with the pragmatist tradition—what works better for human flourishing is morally better.
Cultural and Psychological Evolution:
Some expressivists highlight the evolutionary and psychological development of moral sentiments. Progress is seen as a cultural refinement of emotional and social instincts.
Advantages and Criticisms
Advantages of Expressivism:
Explains Moral Disagreement: It accounts for the passionate nature of moral disagreement without invoking metaphysical entities.
Avoids Ontological Commitment: By denying moral facts, it avoids the "queer" metaphysical commitments criticized by J.L. Mackie.
Captures Practical Function: It emphasizes the action-guiding and motivational role of moral language.
Criticisms:
Frege-Geach Problem: How to handle logical consistency in complex moral sentences if moral claims are not truth-apt?
Thin Account of Progress: Critics argue expressivism reduces progress to shifting preferences, making it hard to justify why some changes (like civil rights) are objectively better.
Risk of Relativism: If moral judgments are just expressions of attitude, it becomes difficult to critique harmful or regressive moral views.
Reframing Moral Progress: A Constructivist Bridge?
Some philosophers attempt to bridge expressivism and constructivism, suggesting that moral norms are constructed through rational deliberation and social practices. From this standpoint, moral progress means improving the procedures by which we arrive at moral norms—through better reasoning, inclusivity, and responsiveness to human needs.
This view retains expressivism’s core insight—that moral values are not discovered but developed—while giving a firmer foundation for evaluating moral change.
Conclusion
Expressivism offers a compelling reinterpretation of moral discourse. By seeing moral statements as expressions of attitudes, it bypasses many metaphysical quandaries that plague moral realism. However, it faces serious challenges in accounting for the notion of moral progress, a concept central to both ethical reflection and social critique.
Nonetheless, by emphasizing coherence, rational reflection, and shared human values, expressivists provide tools for understanding how moral discourse can evolve in ways that feel like progress—even without invoking moral facts. Whether this account is ultimately satisfying depends on how much moral weight one believes our emotions and attitudes can bear.
